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GENERAL HEADINGS.

Cases Reported this Week.

Current Topics.

The Long Vacation.

AUGUST HAS produced the usual crop of letters in the daily press protesting against the stoppage of judicial business for eleven weeks. Something, of course, is to be said for abolishing or curtailing the vacations of the courts. But most of the usual arguments which laymen put forward are based on misunderstandings. It is a mistake to suppose that legal business in the High Court stops merely because the courts are not sitting. During the greater part of the long vacation masters sit in chambers and pleadings are delivered, while once a week the vacation judge disposes of urgent matters. To keep the courts open in August and September would mean that solicitors and their clerks would have to work under great pressure, half being away on holiday; that business men would have to remain in town to act as jurymen; and that litigants would themselves lose their holidays, since there would be no certainty when their cases would occur in the lists. Witnesses, too, in the midst of a jaunt to the seaside would be summoned home to give their evidence in the stifling atmosphere of a court. On the whole, a vacation is as necessary to legal as to other businesses; but in other walks of life such vacation can be obtained by a relay of clerks and the slackening of work. This cannot conveniently be done in the sphere of litigation.

The Origin of the Long Vacation.

IT IS often said that the long vacation has become an anachronism. It had its origin in the days when England was an agricultural country, and when at harvest the judges, barristers, juries, witnesses, all alike had the harvest to gather in. Enclosure Acts and the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth century changed all that. England is now a country in which nine-tenths of the population, including all the business classes most concerned with litigation, are urban folk whom the getting in of the harvest touches not at all. Therefore, so the argument runs, the long vacation has ceased to serve the purpose it once served, and so it should be abolished. But this is a *non sequitur*. Most institutions have outlived the purpose for which they were originally brought into being,

but they remain useful because of a new want they now satisfy. This is true of the autumn holidays. For the whole community it originally came into being, not as a time of rest, but as a time of harvest-getting. The population went into the fields in autumn not to rest but to collect the food of the year to come. The hop-pickers' holiday in Kent is the survival of what once was the universal form of holiday for all classes. And this change o fair and scene proved so beneficial that it has survived, although the original cause has ceased. The long vacation of the lawyer is but in the same case as the utumn holiday of the whole business and industrial world. Each has outlasted its original purpose to serve a new and equally useful one.

Byegone Vacations.

One mode of spending the long vacation which is never likely to revive will be familiar to all readers of Ballantine's and other legal memoirs of the Early Victoria age. The Victorian lawyer, when the long vacation came, unless he belonged to the class who frequent Highland moors, seems to have had one very common method of spending his holiday. Boulogne, with its gambling saloons, expelled from London after 1854, was just across the Channel. There Serjeant Ballantine and other eager punters from the Bar repaired regularly on the twelfth of August, when released from Westminster Hall or the Old Bailey. The attraction of roulette and faro for the tired advocate is easy to explain; its exciting hazards gave a stimulus like that of the frenzied fight in a novel form. The same love of excitement, in a later age, made Lord Russell of Killowen an eager player of club whist and an inveterate reader of Gaboriau's detective stories. The great common law advocate's love of smoking in bed late into the night at the Bar hotel on circuit, while he finished another yellowback, is one of the best-known traditions of the last generation at the Bar. But *tempora mutantur et nos mutantur in illis*. Those days when the Bar was either an aristocratic or a Bohemian profession are gone for ever. The barrister of to-day is a grey-clad man of business with the sobriety of all City men—except stockbrokers, who live a more coloured life. The picturesque ancient pleadings have given way to the sober paperwork which the Judicature Act of 1873 inaugurated. With them, it would almost seem, the romance of the Bar has departed.

The Lost Romance of the Bar.

That the Bar was once a romantic profession is all but forgotten in this twentieth century. To-day the layman and laywoman think of lawyers as solemn pedants not over honest, mere timeservers who drudge in chambers, prostitute their intellects in the courts, climb by doubtful methods into political life, and end up a dull life of doubtful honesty by a career of decorous respectability on the bench. It is not a tempting picture; but we fear that is the way in which the Bar is now regarded. Even so recently as twenty years ago this was all different. Then the wig and gown had charm for all. The young men at the 'Varsities looked forward to the Bar as a noble profession in which a man might make the best of both worlds—might right the wrongs of the helpless and innocent, and achieve both money and fame while doing so. In society of all kinds a barrister was esteemed. Not equally so a solicitor; there were still too many persons who did not love attorneys. To young ladies, too, the Bar was one of the most picturesque and interesting of professions—next only in romantic attractiveness to the Services. One can see all this in many a page of Trollope and Thackeray and Dickens and James Payn and Wilkie Collins, not to go back to Lytton and Scott. Why has it all changed? We fancy the change is in the lawyers themselves. The Bar has become a business, not a sphere of adventure. Practices are largely inherited from a solicitor parent, not won by dash at Sessions or on circuit. The old Bohemianism is gone.

Lawyers in Parliament.

It would be idle to pretend that lawyers are popular to-day with the public at large. Perhaps the age of the soldier never is a time in which lawyers are loved overmuch. Yet the public cannot get on without lawyers. The Prime Minister is a solicitor. So is the leader of the Liberal Opposition. Lord Robert Cecil, the leader of the Independent Conservative Party, and Sir Edward Carson, who leads the old Tories, are barristers of success and standing. The Labour Party alone is not led by a lawyer. Why this indispensability of a class whom the Press and the public profess to distrust and despise? We fancy it is due to the fact that lawyers are the only class of the community who combine sound knowledge and mastery of detail with the practical ability of the man of the world. Business men are specialists and ignorant of theory; hence they make hopeless blunders when they move outside their sphere. Journalists are lacking in balance and practical good sense. Professors are too academic and oversubtle. Even Sir Auckland Geddes, ablest and most practical of the professorial class, and trained in adaptability by his experience in the Army, still has not the balanced sanity of the lawyer. A sense of proportion is the lawyer's greatest asset both in his own professional career and in the affairs of the great world.

Sir Robert Horne, K.C.

The Minister of Labour, who has staved off disaster for nine months of post-bellum conditions in the trade union world, is another sample of the successful lawyer who "makes good" in politics. The leading Scottish advocate of the day, Sir Robert Horne, shewed himself an able administrator during the war in many Government Departments. He is a type of lawyer commoner in Scotland than in England. A brilliant student of philosophy in youth, he brought to the Bar an analytic mind which drew logical distinctions and applied philosophical first principles to the great rules of the common law. But he never was too subtle or too metaphysical. He resembled Lord Bowen without that great lawyer's gift of epigram. It is curious that so distinguished a Scots advocate should have been a mere *nomen ignotum* in England before the war.

Divorce Suits by Alien Enemies.

A point provisionally decided by Mr. Justice Horridge on 30th June was finally disposed of by the same judge towards the end of last sittings: *Kraus* v. *Kraus* (*ante*, p. 760). An Austrian subject, domiciled in England, and registered here as an alien enemy under the requirements of war legislation, took proceedings to seek divorce against his wife. By English law, it is hardly necessary to say, the right to divorce—like other questions of civil status—depends on domicile and not on nationality. The question arose whether the jurisdiction of the Court was not barred by the petitioner's nationality, and the case was adjourned for proof of registration. The necessary proof was given at the resumption by a police-inspector, who produced a sheet from the North Devon register of aliens which contained details relating to the petitioner, whom he identified as the person registered. We draw attention to these details since the practical question of how to prove registration often arises in minor courts, and this case is incidentally an authority on the point of practice and a guide as to the procedure to adopt. Evidence of adultery had previously been given, so that the proof requisite to a decree *nisi* was in order, and a decree was duly made. The learned Judge, following the rule as discussed in *Schaffenius* v. *Goldberg* (1916, 1 K. B. 284), and in *Porter* v. *Freudenburg* (1915, 1 K. B. 857), and definitely laid down in *Princess Thurn and Taxis* v. *Moffit* (31 *Times* L.R. 24), to the effect that a registered and interned alien is residing in England under the protection of the Sovereign, and therefore entitled to the benefits of *jus vindicandi*, held that a registered alien is similarly entitled to take divorce proceedings. The *jus vindicandi*, or right of recourse to litigation in defence of one's legal rights, includes not only common law and equitable remedies, but also the enforcement of consistorial rights formerly protected in the Ecclesiastical Courts.

Merger of Marine Losses.

A VERY curious point led to a remarkable, and at first sight a not very equitable, decision of Mr. JUSTICE BAILHACHE in *Wilson Shipping Co. (Limited)* v. *British and Foreign Insurance Co. (Limited)* (1919, W. N. 243). The facts of the case are almost ideally simple for a commercial cause. The steamship *Eastlands* was insured with underwriters against *marine risks only* under a time policy, and was chartered to the Admiralty. The charter was on Form T. 99, whereon the Admiralty undertake to pay for the loss *by war risks* of ships they have chartered, value to be ascertained as at the date of loss. All this is, of course, usual. Well, the ship encountered a marine peril and suffered injuries which caused her value to depreciate by £1,770. The underwriters were unquestionably liable for this loss, and bound either to repair or to indemnify; but, in fact, before a claim could be put forward or repairing could be undertaken, a war risk caused the vessel to become a total loss. The Admiralty paid her value as at the date of loss—*i.e.*, the depreciated value, which was £1,770 less than would have been the value had the ship been repaired. The owners thereby lost this sum. They now claimed to recover it from the underwriters as the value of the repairs the latter were bound to execute and indemnify the owners against. The claim seems obviously just and equitable. But an unexpected point of law arose. Under the common law, as laid down in the older cases of *Livre* v. *Janson* (1810, 12 East, 648), *Knight* v. *Faith* (1850, 15 Q. B. D. 649), and *Lidgett* v. *Secretan* (1871, L. R. C. C. P. 616), the rule stands as follows: The liability of underwriters for unrepaired damage was not ascertainable until the expiration of the time policy. If before expiration there was a total loss, the underwriters were liable to pay for the total loss, but not for the partial losses which had not yet been repaired. In other words, the partial losses merged in the total loss. This rule, of course, is equitable enough in the case of an ordinary policy, where the same underwriters undertake both partial and total losses, for the indemnity they have to pay for the total loss is based on the original and not the final value of the ship. They escape nothing by the rule, and the owner gets a full indemnity. But where the underwriters insure marine risks and the Admiralty war risks, and where the partial loss due to a marine risk merges in the total loss due to a war risk, the logic and justice of the rule completely disappears. Nevertheless, the learned Judge felt bound to apply the principle of merger and to hold that the subsequent total loss absolved the underwriters from all liability for the earlier partial loss. It is true that the law of marine insurance is now codified in the Act of 1906, but section 91 (2) preserves the common law except when inconsistent with express provisions of the code; and therefore the antiquated common law rule of merger is still in force.

The Evidence Against Dundonald.

AS THE unjust condemnation of COCHRANE has long been considered a blot on the memory of Lord ELLENBOROUGH, it is only fair to point out that there was quite enough evidence against COCHRANE to have secured the conviction of any ordinary adventurer or man of bad character. It is ridiculous to suppose that COCHRANE was really guilty: he was a man of chivalrous character, who suffered the consequences of devotion to an unworthy friend, and a still less worthy relative; but it is really his character that entitles him to a favourable verdict. To men who believed him a rascal—and in those days every Tory regarded a member of the opposition who condemned WELLINGTON'S campaigns in the Peninsula as COCHRANE unceasingly did, as hopeless, as obviously a rascal—the evidence naturally seemed convincing. And Lord ELLENBOROUGH honestly believed COCHRANE to be a rascal. The facts were these: On the 21st of February, 1814, during NAPOLEON'S last stand in France, an adventurer BERENGER, dressed as an officer in foreign uniform, arrived at Dover with false despatches for the Port Admiral stating that NAPOLEON was dead. The semaphore carried the news to London, and wild speculation followed on the exchanges. BERENGER made a triumphal progress from Dover to London, but by the time he arrived his news and his authority were doubted; he was mobbed in the streets, and took refuge at COCHRANE'S lodgings. He had been a military acquaintance of COCHRANE, who had a high opinion of his capacity as an officer of Marines. COCHRANE lent him a suit of clothes to escape the mob; he escaped to Dover, but was arrested. Then it transpired that COCHRANE-JOHNSTONE, a merchant and an uncle of Lord DUNDONALD, had employed BERENGER to carry out his hoax, and had decamped with a fortune made on the Stock Exchange during the last few days. BUTT, a broker, was also involved in the conspiracy. Then it turned out, indeed COCHRANE frankly mentioned it himself, that he had been speculating on the Stock Exchange for months past through his uncle's broker (BUTT), although not during the days of BERENGER'S escapade. Naturally COCHRANE-JOHNSTONE, BUTT, BERENGER and COCHRANE were placed on trial for conspiracy and convicted; as regards the first three, no one doubts the justice of their conviction. COCHRANE moved for a new trial as regards himself in the King's Bench; but it is clear that there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty against him, and no error in the reasoning of the Court which could support a writ of error—to quash the proceedings. COCHRANE'S relations with the culprits, his chivalrous assistance to BERENGER by lending him a suit of clothes, and his recent indulgence in Stock Exchange speculation, are clearly circumstantial evidence on which a jury might convict. It is scarcely fair to blame Lord ELLENBOROUGH for sharing the universal belief of the average partisan of the day that COCHRANE was a vile and unscrupulous adventurer; any more than it would be fair to blame Mr. Justice DARLING for holding no exalted opinion of Mr. PEMBERTON BILLING. But it is clearly undesirable that the Lord Chief Justice of England should be the member of a Cabinet, even a War Cabinet, and should preside over the trial of an inveterate political opponent.

Sales of Agricultural Land.

AMONG THE last batch of Acts to receive the Royal Assent was the Agricultural Land Sales (Restriction of Notices to Quit) Act, 1919. Since it is of considerable importance, and is not likely to be issued for some time, we print elsewhere the text of the Bill, as amended on third reading in the House of Lords. The Act, which was passed on the 19th August, provides that, on the making, after that date, of a contract for the sale of an agricultural holding held on a yearly tenancy, any notice to determine the tenancy given to the tenant, either before or after 19th August, will be null and void unless the tenant agrees otherwise. In other words, there cannot be a sale, save by the tenant's consent, with the benefit of a current notice to quit. Possession can only be obtained by the purchaser under a notice given after the contract. There is a saving for contracts for public purposes made within the next three years.

A new order dealing with the lighting of all forms of traffic will be made shortly by the Ministry of Ways and Communications. The growing demand that the wise lighting restrictions imposed under D.O.R.A., and recently revoked, should be reinstituted awaits a reply from Sir Eric Geddes. The Home Office, in the presence of the new Ministry of Ways and Communications, is powerless, but there is little doubt that all traffic will shortly be recontrolled from the point of view of lights. The reinstitution of the red light order is supported by motorists, cyclists, cattle dealers and pedestrians. Feeling is unanimous that vehicles, cattle, sheep and horses using the roads at night should be lighted adequately. "The situation at present is Gilbertian," said the manager of the legal branch of the Automobile Association recently. "Can you imagine anything more ridiculous than that the fast moving vehicle should be compelled under law to exhibit a warning red light while farm carts, 'push bikes,' and cattle can travel the roads without any indication of their presence? It is pathetically funny that a motor-car is, legally, supposed to be in the position of a perambulator or a wheelbarrow, while these vehicles can roll along in the dark, regardless of the danger of being run down on some gloomy road. We are bringing as much pressure to bear as possible on the authorities to reintroduce the wise order of the red light, and at the same time we have written to our associates urging them to restrict the lighting of their cars or motor-cycles to what is reasonably necessary for their own safety and that of other traffic."

Reform and the Bar.

I.—The Question of Fusion.

In this short series of articles we propose to discuss briefly and in a detached spirit some of the great questions of Reconstruction in the legal profession which are knocking at our doors. It is useless to ignore the uprising of new views on this subject. However much we love the old ways and the old traditions, only a Rip Van Winkle will hope that the things he has loved can continue unchanged for ever. As Mr. W. E. Gladstone once said, in the most eloquent passage of his most famous speech: "The great social forces move on in their might and their majesty, which even the tumult of our debates can not for one moment impede or disturb." So it is with law reform. We in Bell Yard or in the Inns of Court may stand aghast at changes, but we must bow our heads before them. The wise man will watch carefully the manifest tendency of events, and where he can preserve essentials by conceding details will not fail to make a timely compromise.

The first and greatest question of Legal Reconstruction is obviously that of the future relationship between advocate and solicitor. In the legal profession, in both its branches, opinion is divided. Nearly the whole Bar is against fusion. The majority of provincial solicitors are against it; possibly the majority of London practitioners are in favour of it, although the majority is not great. Business men, our experience goes, seem mostly to favour it. The leaders of the working classes unmistakably share the same view. The public at large is in doubt, but visibly influenced by a desire to escape by fusion two sets of costs. We therefore propose to consider briefly the arguments in favour of fusion and the objections to it. An eirenicon in the shape of an intermediate proposal will then be tentatively suggested, not as our considered opinion, but merely as a basis for discussion and a possible line of compromise.

There are at least three strong reasons given for fusion. The first is that the present system involves the litigant in two sets of costs, that of the barrister and that of the solicitor. The second is that it imposes an inferior status on solicitors and limits their opportunities. The third is that it places a barrier between the lay client and members of the Bar, thereby shutting out from hopes of practice innumerable young advocates devoid of influence or connection with solicitors, and tending to turn the profession very largely into a preserve for the sons of solicitors, so that great talents are often wasted in a futile struggle for recognition and work. All these points are important, and we shall consider them—pro and con.

Now it must be admitted that the duplication of professions does lead to a certain increase of costs. This is not so great as is commonly imagined. As a matter of fact no work is paid for twice over, as the public often erroneously imagine. There are two kinds of work which require to be done in the preparation of a case, or a conveyancy, or an opinion—namely, the routine work and the original work of the professional expert. The latter may take the form of advocacy, of artistic draftsmanship, or of a scholarly investigation into the legal principles which govern the case, but in each case it is quite distinct from the routine work. Now the barrister's fees are paid for the original, and the solicitor's costs for the routine work. Both have to be done. Where the professions are united, as in the United States, both are done and paid for at rates not lower than in England. The duplication of professions causes a distribution of the reward as well as the work; but it does not call into existence any novel or duplicate form of payment. The only exceptions to this rule are rather trivial matters of expense, such as the costs of drafting instructions for counsel and the fee to his clerk. But it is not certain that all these items—in themselves almost negligible—would be avoided by the fusion of the professions. In important cases, it would still be necessary to call in a specialist and pay the cost of instructing him. In the medical profession, where fusion is accompanied by specialisation between consultant and general practitioner, the expense of duplicate fees to both is still in difficult cases unavoidable.

But now this may be admitted, yet a further objection taken. It may be agreed that the items of cost will be much the same with fusion as without it. But it may be contended that, notwithstanding, the actual cost will be greater. For where fusion exists all the work is done in one set of chambers with one set of clerks. The same solicitor may do both kinds of work, routine and expert. If he does not, two members of the same firm will do both. The firm, therefore, will get all the costs and not only the solicitor's share or the barrister's share, as the case may be. Its profits will be much higher, say twice as high without any, or very little, increase in clerical and office expenses. An economy will have been effected resulting in a large surplus. In accordance with ordinary economic laws, this surplus will be distributed by competition between the lawyer and the client—*i.e.*, the lawyer will be able to charge lower fees and deliver a lower bill of costs while nevertheless retaining enough of the surplus to make a handsome profit. This sounds plausible. No doubt some slight economy of the sort might in time be effected. Indeed, in county court cases, where the solicitor to-day briefs counsel instead of doing a case himself, his costs are lower. But these services are a little unreal. In the county court case where counsel is briefed the client gets the benefit of a specialist, and it is generally agreed that he gains an advantage by so doing. The advantage is probably not out of proportion to the extra fee he has to pay. If fusion came about, the solicitor-advocate would have to get this extra fee, so that the economy would be largely nugatory in practice.

Again, it must be pointed out that the expense of litigation is not due to the high fees of the Bar, but to the fancy fees paid fashionable counsel. The Bar is full of able men willing to work for reasonable and even for small fees. But the lay-client and the solicitor too often will not have these men. They want an advocate with a reputation, whose name is always in the papers, who is always to be seen in court. Such men, of course, are few in number and have almost a monopoly. To get them, one must pay monopoly prices—*i.e.*, high fees. Exactly the same difficulty would arise if the professions were fused. The real remedy for high fees, in our humble opinion, is for solicitors to take more pains in finding out capable men who have not large practices. At present the average solicitor does not regard this as any part of his duty. If his client can afford a high fee, he recommends a fashionable practitioner. If the client cannot pay much, then the solicitor usually tells him he cannot expect a well-known advocate, which is quite true, and gives the brief either to some friend or connection of his own or to some young barrister in eminent counsel's chambers recommended by the latter's clerk—not always a wholly disinterested adviser. Solicitors, we think, might make a much more serious effort than at present they seem to do to discover potential talent at the Bar. But however that may be, it is the monopoly of fashion, not the separation of the professions, which causes high fees at the Bar. Of course, certain practices at the Bar—the custom of two counsel where a silk is employed, and the system of retaining fees—add to the amount of counsel's fees. But these customs and others, to which we will return in a later article, can be abolished without fusion of the professions.

Perhaps a more influential argument than the question of cost is the effect of severance on the status and prospects of solicitors. Barristers enjoy superior rights of audience in the higher courts, the monopoly of appointments to the bench, and greater social consideration than do solicitors. It is true that the young solicitor of brilliant parts who finds his feet as an advocate in the county court or the police courts can afterwards come to the Bar and win his way to great place and power. The late Sir Samuel Evans, the present Master of the Rolls, Mr. Justice Bailhache, Mr. Holman Gregory, K.C., are a few striking examples of the success which a sometime solicitor may attain if and when he elects for the higher branch. But the average solicitor who has no great hopes of success if he abandons his comfortable living to follow in the footsteps of these eminent men is not much comforted by these considerations. He feels that the existence of a

higher and privileged branch depresses the status of his own profession. There is something to be said for this. But probably the change of status involved by fusion would not have the levelling-up effect desired. Rather it would lower the level of the Bar. In truth, the status of the professions as such is fast passing away. To-day a man is judged and esteemed socially, not by his profession or trade, but by his personal qualities, his birth and education, and—last but not least in a materialistic age—his success and riches. The solicitor who is making a reasonable but not a handsome income has nothing much to gain in prestige by fusion of the professions. He has a good deal to lose if he lets in the competition of the vast army of unemployed barristers.

Lastly, one meets with the argument that fusion would help the briefless barrister. To-day many able, industrious, and brilliant men languish all their lives without a practice, earning a miserable livelihood by reporting, coaching, book-writing, index-compiling, and a score other forms of wretched hackwork. They have no connection among solicitors or men of business; have not succeeded in getting into busy chambers at the Bar, and have no means of making their talents known to solicitors. Fusion of the two professions would enable them to approach the public directly and get a start from some litigious lay-friend. But this argument seems worthless. If the lay-client wants to employ a friend at the Bar, he can always tell his solicitor to brief him. The good men who fail are men who have no influential friends, or whose friends—as is often the case, for a prophet is seldom honoured in his own country—have not the sagacity to recognize their merits. This would not be remedied by merely removing the intervention of the solicitor between layman and barrister.

The conclusion, then, at which we seem to have arrived is that no great and obvious advantages are likely to be derived from the fusion of the two branches of the legal profession. On the other hand, it is difficult to see any answer in logic to the demand that fusion should take place. True, the branches represent two different forms of specialized work; but similar specialization exists in most other professions—*e.g.*, medicine, architecture, journalism—without the existence of distinct professional bodies to represent and discipline each special field. Elsewhere the man who can play both parts, concurrently or at successive stages of his career, is allowed to attempt them, while his less versatile fellows choose one special walk. It is not easy to see any reason, except tradition, why the branches of the law should not be similarly united and special lines left to the individual's unfettered choice. In the Colonies, indeed, and in the United States, this is the rule. Logic in the long run usually prevails, and therefore it seems probable that—for good or for evil—the future will see some approach towards the union of the Bar and the Law Society.

In the meantime we would suggest a few practical innovations which, without altering the present time-honoured dualism, would help to bring about most of the actual advantages claimed by the supporters of fusion. In the first place, the county court should be given unlimited first instance jurisdiction in all civil suits (as distinguished from matrimonial and criminal proceedings); a jurisdiction already possessed by the Scots counterpart, the Sheriff Court. The High Court should be restricted in jurisdiction to appeals from the lower tribunals, and the issue of the prerogative writs (mandamus, certiorari, etc.)! This would give solicitors the right of equal audience in all first instance courts. The same right of audience should be extended to solicitors at quarter sessions and assizes and the Old Bailey. As an equivalent for their lost monopoly, the Bar should be allowed to take briefs direct in any court where the solicitor has the right of audience, but not in the High Courts and the other superior tribunals. Again, a barrister or solicitor who wishes to change his branch for the other should be permitted to do so without passing examinations or abandoning his own branch prior to the actual date of entry into the other. And both branches, as in Scotland, should be equally eligible for appointments as stipendiaries or county court judges.

The New Aliens Order.

THE new Aliens Order (*ante*, p. 764), which received the Royal Assent on 18th August, marks the close of a controversy. Two opinions have existed in the country and among jurists as to the future policy that ought to be adopted towards aliens. One view is that the war had disclosed fundamental weaknesses in the traditional British policy of an open port and a harbour of refuge for aliens; the time had come when, even under peace conditions, a great distinction would have to be drawn between subjects of the State, born or naturalized, and the mere "strangers within our gates." The other view was that such a distinction, except during war time and thereafter, to a limited extent in the case of aliens recently alien enemies, is unsound in principle and impolitic. The latter view held that allegiance is not a good basis for distinctions of status. It held that domicil, not nationality, should be the test of such differences. This was the traditional policy of British and American society, which treated *domicil* as the acid test in question of status, therein differing from all foreign systems of law, which treated *nationality* as that test. The new Aliens Order has definitely closed the controversy by imposing permanent restrictions on all aliens, friendly or otherwise, which are not imposed on British subjects.

The Order consists of twenty-four clauses distributed amongst three parts. Part I. relates to the "Admission" of Aliens; Part II. to their "Supervision and Deportation"; Part III. is "General." Roughly speaking, all three reproduce, with slight modification, in a permanent form the main provision of temporary legislation on the subject. Former alien enemies may not land in the United Kingdom except with the permission of the Secretary of State, and alien friends or relations may not land except with the leave of an immigration officer. They may only enter at "approved" ports. Any conditions which an immigration officer, duly authorized, thinks necessary in the case of any particular alien may be attached by him on allowing the alien to land. These are the provisions of Clauses 1, 2, and 3 of the order; we needly say that in substance they merely reproduce the common form of legislation on this subject to be found in the United States, in our Colonies, and most foreign countries.

Part I. of the Order, moreover, goes on to provide that an alien can only be granted leave to land by the immigration officer provided he satisfies the following conditions precedent, set out in Clause (3):—

> (*a*) He is in a position to support himself and his dependents; (*b*) being desirous of entering the service of an employer in the United Kingdom he produces a permit in writing for his engagement issued to the employer by the Minister of Labour; (*c*) he is not a lunatic, idiot, or mentally deficient; (*d*) he is not the subject of a certificate given to the immigration officer by a medical inspector that for medical reasons it is undesirable that he should be permitted to land; (*e*) he has not been sentenced in a foreign country for any extradition crime; (*f*) he is not the subject of a deportation order in force or of an expulsion order; (*g*) he has not been prohibited from landing by the Secretary of State; and (*h*) he fulfils such other requirements as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State.

Part II. of the Order deals with a large number of requirements controlling the residence of aliens who have been permitted to enter. The most important of them relate to registration, and may be summarized as follows:—Aliens over sixteen are still to be registered. The provisions regarding change of residence or of circumstance remain substantially the same. Absence from his registered address for over two months must be notified by the alien. The particulars to be furnished to the registration officer are now as follows:—(1) Name in full, and sex. (2) Present nationality and how and when acquired, and previous nationality (if any). (3) Date and country of birth. (4) Profession or occupation. (5) Date, place, and mode of arrival in United Kingdom. (6) Address of residence in United Kingdom. (7) Address of last residence outside the United Kingdom. (8) Photograph (which, if not furnished by the alien, may be taken by the registration officer). (9) Government services, name of country served, nature and duration of service, and rank or appointments held. (10) Par-

ticulars of passport or other document establishing nationality and identity. (11) Signature (which, if required, shall be in the characters of the language of the alien's nationality), and finger prints if required. (12) Any other matters of which particulars are required by the registration officer (paragraph 6).

Certain duties are cast on householders by paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Order. Where an alien is resident with a householder the latter is responsible for his compliance with the regulations. Where the householder is a keeper of premises, and of a hotel or lodgings, where guests are received for reward, he must keep up a register of aliens, provided the alien received as a guest is over sixteen years of age.

In addition, this part of the Order provides for the closing of certain areas to all aliens by the Home Secretary on the recommendation of the Admiralty, Army Council, or the Council. The police are empowered to close refreshment houses used by aliens "of criminal or disloyal associations," or "conducted in an improper manner." Special restrictions as regards residence and the possession of arms, explosives, cameras, &c., may also be imposed by the Home Secretary on any particular alien or class of aliens. He may also order the deportation of any alien "if he deems it to be conducive to the public good." It is obvious that the wide power contained in this sweeping, but vague, provision must have *some* limits; it is discretionary, but presumably the discretion must be exercised at least *bonâ fide;* and some question on writs of *habeas corpus* seem likely, soon or later, to come before the courts. Of course, aliens all are required to possess passports.

Part III. of the Order contains some slight modification of its otherwise drastic provisions. Paragraph 19 empowers the Secretary of State to exempt any person or class of persons from the requirements of the Order, either absolutely or conditionally. Apparently this power exists not only in the case of aliens in general but also in the case of former alien enemies. In substance it seems to revive in a novel form the old "Letters of Denization," or authority of the Sovereign to reside here, which used to be granted not infrequently by British monarchs in days prior to the enactment of the Naturalization Act, 1871.

Another modification of the stringent powers of the Order is intended to aid aliens who are merely passing through this country on their way elsewhere. They are entitled to land, and are free from the necessity of registration subject to certain conditions. Each must satisfy the immigration officer that (i.) he holds a prepaid ticket to some destination out of the United Kingdom, and that the master or owner of the ship in which he arrived in, or by which he is to leave the United Kingdom, has given satisfactory security that he will not remain in, or re-enter, the United Kingdom, and will be properly maintained and controlled during transit; or (ii.) having taken his ticket in the United Kingdom, and embarked direct therefrom for some other country after a period of residence in the United Kingdom of not less than six months, he has been refused admission to that country, and has returned direct therefrom to a port in the United Kingdom. Without some such provision it is clear that the United Kingdom would become a closed country for foreign tourists or commercial travellers.

The Order is, no doubt, a great experiment. Indeed, all civilized countries at present are adopting some system of that kind. The Briton who goes abroad finds himself subject to similar conditions of restriction. We are inclined to think that sooner or later each country will find these restrictions so burdensome on its own subjects resident abroad that a treaty will be arranged for the purpose of mitigating the restraint on freedom imposed. In the meantime the Courts of Law are not unlikely to find that the Order will require much interpretation at their hands.

An Army Order which has now been issued renders all warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men (with the exception of Regular soldiers serving on normal attestations), who enlisted voluntarily prior to 1st July, 1918, eligible for demobilization as soon as the exigencies of the service permit. The instructions for the release of these men, in so far as they have not volunteered for the Armies of Occupation, will be completed by 1st November, subject to the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the German Government and to the necessary transport being available.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

Before the Vacation Judge.

MITCHELL AND OTHERS *v.* TURNER. P. O. Lawrence, J. 20th August.

LANDLORD AND TENANT—AGREEMENT FOR ONE YEAR—"RENT PAYABLE MONTHLY IN ADVANCE UNTIL EITHER PARTY SHALL GIVE THREE MONTHS' NOTICE IN WRITING TO TERMINATE THE TENANCY"—TENANCY CONTINUED AFTER FIRST YEAR EXPIRES—THREE MONTHS' NOTICE NOT EXPIRING ON ANNIVERSARY OF TENANCY—WHETHER SUCH NOTICE WAS VALID.

By an agreement of tenancy premises were let from 1st April, 1917, to the 1st April, 1918, at a yearly rent of £90 (or £7 10s. per month), the first payment of £7 10s. to be paid on the signing of the agreement, and thenceforward in advance on the first day of each month "until either party shall give three months' notice in writing to terminate the tenancy." The tenant entered into possession, and paid rent regularly in advance. He was served with a notice to quit expiring on 1st July, 1919.

Held, that in this case the notice was a valid notice.

Short cause. The plaintiffs, the landlords, entered into an agreement on 13th April, 1917, to let to the defendant certain premises known as 14, Market-place, Marylebone, "from the first day of April, 1917, to the first day of April, 1918, at a yearly rent of £90 (or £7 10s. per month) . . . the first payment of £7 10s. to be paid on the signing hereof and thenceforward in advance on the first day of each month until either party shall give three months' notice in writing to terminate the tenancy. . . ." The tenant entered into possession, and regularly paid the rent in advance as it accrued due. The landlords in 1919 desired possession, and they served the tenant with a three months' notice in writing, which expired on 1st July. The tenant refused to go out on the notice, asserting that he was a yearly tenant, and therefore the notice was invalid, as it did not expire at the period of the year when the tenancy commenced. The landlords thereupon claimed possession under ord. 14, r. 8. It was not disputed that, having held over his term, the tenant was a yearly tenant, and but for the words in the lease, "until either party shall give three months' notice," his defence would be a good one. But it was said that the usual six months was cut down by those words to three months (see *Kemp* v. *Derrett*, 3 Camp. 510), and that on the true construction of the agreement a three months' notice terminating on the first of any month was a good notice. Reliance was placed on Lord Campbell's judgment in *Doe d. King* v. *Grafton* (L. R. 18 Q. B. 96), which was considered and distinguished in *Lewis* v. *Baker* (No. 2) (1906, 2 K. B. 599). In the former case the words as to the termination of the tenancy were almost the same as here, except that they were in the *habendum* itself, and it was held they did not constitute a yearly tenancy. The words "until such tenancy shall be determined" defined the terminus *ad quem* the tenancy was to run. The tenancy was created by the words fixing the demise from 1st April. Farwell, L.J., in that case, however, expressly said that if the *habendum* had run "to hold the same from the 13th day of May until notice to quit shall be given as hereinafter mentioned, there would have been a term certain during which the tenancy would last, as in *Doe d. King* v. *Grafton*." For the defendant it was contended that this was the case of a yearly tenancy which in the absence of words to the contrary would be terminable, if the tenant continued to hold on after his term had expired, by a six months' notice terminable at the period of the year when the tenancy commenced. Six months could be cut down by agreement, and here the parties had agreed that three months' notice should be given. The agreement spoke of a "yearly rent"—*i.e.*, a "yearly tenancy," and a yearly tenancy can only be terminated by a notice expiring at the period when the tenancy began in the absence of words to the contrary. The only difficulty was as to the words "until either party shall give three months notice."

P. O. LAWRENCE, J., said that in his view the point raised was a short one, depending on the construction to be placed on this particular agreement. The agreement was that "the plaintiffs agree to let and the defendant agrees to take" the premises "from the 1st day of April, 1917, to the 1st day of April, 1918, at a yearly rent of £90 (or £7 10s. per month), free from all deductions whatsoever except landlord's property tax . . . the first payment of £7 10s. to be paid on the signing hereof and thenceforward in advance on the first day of each month until either party shall give three months' notice in writing to terminate the tenancy. . . ." Now, one thing was quite clear that it was a tenancy for a year certain subject to three months' notice in writing. It was contended by the tenant, who had been served with a three months' notice to quit terminating on 1st July, 1919, that the notice was invalid, because no valid notice could be given which did not expire on 1st April. If that view was correct the insertion of such an option in the lease was redundant. It must have been intended as affording an alternative way of terminating the lease. It was argued that this was a yearly tenancy, and could only be ended at the period of the year when the tenancy was created. I am going to decide that if a tenant holds over his term he holds over subject to exactly the same conditions as he held the premises under the lease. In my view this notice could be given at any time so as to expire at the expiration of any month. The notice therefore which expired on 1st July, 1919, was

a valid notice, and it followed that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment with costs.—COUNSEL, for the plaintiffs, *E. H. Tindal-Atkinson;* for the defendant, *A. de W. Milligan.* SOLICITORS, *Greenwell, Higham, & Co.; G. P. R. Burgess.*

[Reported by ESKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

CASES OF LAST SITTINGS.

Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.

ESKELL v. ESKELL. Coleridge, J. 20th June.

DIVORCE—PRACTICE—EVIDENCE OF ADULTERY—DECREE IN PREVIOUS SUIT.

A decree in a divorce suit founded on the co-respondent's admission of adultery is evidence of adultery against him as respondent in a subsequent suit.

This was a wife's undefended suit for divorce on the grounds of her husband's desertion and adultery. The desertion was proved. The petitioner put forward a decree in a previous suit, *Mercer-Adams* v. *Mercer-Adams and Eskell*, as evidence of the adultery charged. In that suit the petitioner's husband had been the co-respondent. The petitioner, in her evidence, said that she had been in Court during the hearing of that suit, and that the co-respondent was her husband and the respondent in the present suit. Counsel for the petitioner cited *Ruck* v. *Ruck* (1896, P. 152), where a decree in a former suit, in which the husband was co-respondent, was held not to be sufficient evidence of his adultery, because the jury then had only found the respondent guilty of adultery with him, and had not expressly found him guilty of adultery with the respondent. In this case the decree in *Mercer-Adams* v. *Mercer-Adams and Eskell* was made partly on the co-respondent's own admission. That sufficiently distinguished the case from *Ruck* v. *Ruck*. In *Swan* v. *Swan* (*The Times*, March 24, 1903), Jeune, P., held that the fact that damages were awarded against the co-respondent was sufficient to make the decree good evidence.

COLERIDGE, J., said that the wife had proved that her husband was the co-respondent in *Mercer-Adams* v. *Mercer-Adams and Eskell*, and the fact that the decree in that case was made partly on his own admission distinguished it from *Ruck* v. *Ruck* (supra), and made the decree good evidence against the respondent. — COUNSEL, *Acton Pile*. SOLICITORS, *Robbins, Olivey & Lake*, for *Whittuck, Pitt, & Elswell*, Bristol.

[Reported by C. G. TALBOT-PONSONBY, Barrister-at-Law.]

JOLLY v. JOLLY AND FRYER. Hill, J. 2nd July.

DIVORCE—HUSBAND'S SUIT—RESPONDENT VIRGO INTACTA—PARTIAL INTERCOURSE—ADULTERY—DECREE NISI.

A decree of divorce founded on adultery can be made although on the medical evidence there can only have been partial intercourse.

This was a husband's suit for divorce on the ground of the alleged adultery of his wife with the co-respondent. The respondent did not appear or put in an answer. The co-respondent appeared and filed an answer denying adultery, and alleging that the respondent was "virgo intacta." The petitioner, in his evidence, said that he had lived with his wife and had had intercourse with her. The respondent had admitted to him, and also to his solicitor, that she had committed adultery with the co-respondent both at Arundel and at Hove, and evidence was given that the respondent and co-respondent had stayed at the latter place together as husband and wife. Counsel put in two certificates from a Dr. Hogarth, of Morecambe, in which the doctor stated that he had examined the respondent and found her "virgo intacta," and that her hymen had not been ruptured, but that partial intercourse was possible, and referred to *Harry* v. *Harry* (*The Times*, April 4th and 5th, 1919), in which case Coleridge, J., found the respondent guilty of adultery with a woman who produced a doctor's certificate that she was "virgo intacta." Counsel submitted that the petitioner had made out his case and was entitled to a decree, as partial intercourse was sufficient to sustain the charge of adultery.

HILL, J., said that he was satisfied that adultery had taken place and pronounced a decree *nisi*.—COUNSEL, *Talbot-Ponsonby*, for the petitioner; *J. Harvey Murphy*, for co-respondent. SOLICITORS, *Rawle, Johnstone, & Co.*, for *Whiteside & Knowles*, Morecambe, for petitioner; *Neave, Morton, & Co.*, for co-respondent.

[Reported by C. G. TALBOT-PONSONBY, Barrister-at-Law.]

New Orders, &c.

A Proclamation

REVOKING A PROCLAMATION, DATED THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER, 1917, RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN ARTICLES INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Whereas by a Proclamation, dated the twenty-first day of December, 1917, made in pursuance of Section 43 of the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, We thought fit, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, to prohibit the importation into the United Kingdom of all bonds, debentures, stock or share certificates, scrip and other documents of title relating to any stocks, shares or other securities; with the exception of matured bonds redeemable in the United Kingdom and coupons falling due for payment in the United Kingdom, and of any such goods imported under licence given by or on behalf of Our Treasury, and subject to the provisions and conditions of such licence:

And whereas it appears to Us that the said Proclamation should be revoked:

Now, therefore, We, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, hereby proclaim, direct and ordain, that the said Proclamation of the twenty-first day of December, 1917, shall be, and the same is hereby, revoked.

18th August. [*Gazette*, 19th August.

Orders in Council.

THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH ACT, 1919 (TRANSFER OF PROPERTY) ORDER, 1919.

Whereas by Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Ministry of Health Act, 1919, it is enacted that His Majesty may by Order in Council make provision for the transfer of any property, rights or liabilities held, enjoyed or incurred by any Government Department in connection with any powers or duties transferred to the Minister of Health by the provisions of the Act.

Now, therefore, &c., it is hereby ordered as follows:—

1. All funds, bonds, securities, investments, sums of money and other property, rights, and assets belonging to, or vested in, or held in trust for the Local Government Board, the Insurance Commissioners, or the Welsh Insurance Commissioners in relation to the powers and duties transferred to the Minister of Health by the provisions of the said Act shall be, and shall from the 1st July, 1919, be deemed to have been transferred to, and vested in, and held in trust for the Minister as successor of the Local Government Board, the Insurance Commissioners, and the Welsh Insurance Commissioners without the necessity of any transfer, assignment or other instrument, but subject to all debts and liabilities affecting the same, and shall be held by the Minister for the purposes for which they are now held, or would have been held, if the said Act had not passed.

2. The Interpretation Act, 1889, applies for the purpose of the interpretation of this Order as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.

3. This Order may be cited as the Ministry of Health Act, 1919 (Transfer of Property) Order, 1919.

18th August. [*Gazette*, 19th August.

THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (CONSULTATIVE COUNCILS) ORDER, 1919.

Whereas by Section 4 of the Ministry of Health Act, 1919, it is enacted as follows:—

(1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty by Order in Council to establish consultative councils in England and Wales for giving, in accordance with the provisions of the Order, advice and assistance to the Minister in connection with such matters affecting or incidental to the health of the people as may be referred to in such Order.

(2) Every such council shall include women as well as men, and shall consist of persons having practical experience of the matters referred to the council.

Now, therefore, &c., it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. Consultative Councils shall be established in pursuance of the foregoing provisions for giving, in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained, advice and assistance in connection with such matters as relate severally to:—

(1) Medical and Allied Services.
(2) National Health Insurance (Approved Societies' Work).
(3) Local Health Administration.
(4) General Health Questions.

2. Each council shall consist of such numbers of members, not exceeding twenty, as the Minister may determine, being persons having,

in the case of each council, practical experience of the matters for the purposes of which the council in question is established.

3.—(1) The members of a council shall be appointed by the Minister, and shall include women as well as men.

11.—(1) A council shall consider and report upon the questions from time to time referred to them by the Minister, including—

(*a*) questions arising upon the draft of Orders in Council, and of Regulations, Orders, and Special Orders proposed to be made by the Minister;

(*b*) questions involving considerations of important principle and scientific difficulty affecting or incidental to the health of the people;

(*c*) any other questions in connection with such of the powers and duties of the Minister as relate to matters affecting or incidental to the health of the people;

and the Minister shall place at the disposal of the council the information required to enable them to consider the matters thus referred to them.

(2) A council may propose to the Minister from time to time that any question in connection with such of his powers and duties as relate to matters affecting or incidental to the health of the people, if pertaining to the functions of the council, shall form the subject of a reference to the council, and the Minister shall receive and consider any such proposal.

(3) A council may also present to the Minister from time to time a report on any matter affecting or incidental to the health of the people, if pertaining to the functions of the council, which has not been made a subject of reference to the council under the foregoing provisions of this Order, and the Minister shall receive and consider such report.

12. Subject to the provisions contained in this Order a council may regulate their own procedure.

13. The Interpretation Act, 1889, applies for the purpose of the interpretation of this Order as it applies to the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.

14. This Order may be cited as the Ministry of Health (Consultative Councils) Order, 1919.

18th August. [*Gazette*, 19th August.

The Ministry of Health (Welsh Consultative Council) Order, 1919, has also been issued.

ASSIZE BUSINESS.

Whereas by an Order in Council, bearing date the 14th day of May, 1912, certain arrangements were made with reference to the Commission Days on the respective Circuits, and the taking of civil and criminal business at certain Assize towns:

And whereas it is expedient that the said Order should be amended in manner hereinafter appearing:

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that:—

1. At the end of paragraph (*c*) of the Order in Council of the 14th May, 1912, the following words shall be added:—

"and any direction so given may specify the cause or causes so to be taken or may provide for the taking of civil business generally at the town to which it relates."

2. This Order and the Order in Council of the 14th May, 1912, may be cited together as the Circuits Orders in Council, 1912 and 1919.

18th August. [*Gazette*, 19th August.

COUNTY COURTS.

REDISTRIBUTION OF EAST ANGLIAN DISTRICTS.

Whereas it is provided by the County Courts Act, 1888, amongst other things, that it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor from time to time to alter the distribution of the districts among the Judges, and for that purpose to remove any Judge from all or any of the districts of which he is Judge for the purpose of appointing him to any other district or districts, or to appoint any such Judge to be the Judge of any district or districts in addition to the district or districts of which he is the Judge:

Now, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in that behalf by the said Act or otherwise in me vested, I, the Right Honourable Frederick, Lord Birkenhead, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order as follows:—

1. His Honour Judge Henry Gatchell Farrant shall cease to be additional Judge of the County Court of Middlesex, held at Edmonton and Wood Green.

2. His Honour Judge Sir George Sherston Baker, Bart., shall be the Judge of the district of the County Court of Lincolnshire, held at Holbeach, in addition to districts of which he is now the Judge.

3. The several Judges mentioned in the first column of the Schedule hereto shall be the Judges of the districts of the several County Courts set opposite to their names respectively in the second column of the said Schedule.

4. All orders heretofore made shall, so far as any of the said Judges are thereby appointed to be Judges or additional Judges of the districts of any County Courts other than those set opposite to their names respectively in the second column of the said Schedule, be revoked.

5. This Order shall come into operation on the first day of October, 1919.

14th August. *Birkenhead*, C.

SCHEDULE.

First Column.	Second Column.
JUDGE.	COURTS.
	CIRCUIT No. 32.
His Honour Judge Mulligan, K.C.	*Norfolk*:— Attleborough, Aylsham, Beccles and Bungay, Downham Market, East Dereham, Fakenham, Great Yarmouth, Harleston, Holt, King's Lynn, Lowestoft, North Walsham, Norwich, Swaffham, Thetford, Wymondham.
	CIRCUIT No. 33.
His Honour Judge Eardley Wilmot	*Essex*:— Colchester, Clacton, Harwich and Halstead, Dunmow and Braintree.
	Suffolk:— Bury St. Edmunds, Diss and Eye, Framlingham and Saxmundham, Hadleigh, Halesworth, Haverhill, Ipswich, Stowmarket, Sudbury, Woodbridge and Felixstowe.
	CIRCUIT No. 35.
His Honour Judge Farrant ...	*Bedfordshire*:— Ampthill, Bedford, Biggleswade, Leighton Buzzard.
	Buckinghamshire:— Newport Pagnell.
	Cambridgeshire:— Cambridge, Ely, March, Newmarket, Wisbech.
	Essex:— Saffron Walden.
	Hertfordshire:— Bishop's Stortford, Hitchin, Royston.
	Huntingdonshire:— Huntingdon, St. Neots.
	Suffolk:— Mildenhall.
	Northamptonshire:— Peterborough, Thrapstone and Oundle.
	CIRCUIT No. 38.
His Honour Judge Crawford ...	*Essex*:— Brentwood, Chelmsford, Grays, Thurrock, Maldon, Romford and Ilford, Southend, Waltham Abbey.
	Middlesex:— Edmonton and Wood Green.

NORFOLK COUNTY COURTS.

Whereas it is enacted by the County Courts Act, 1888, that it shall be lawful for His Majesty by Order in Council, amongst other things, from time to time to alter the number and boundaries of the Districts and the place of holding any Court, and to order the discontinuance of the holding of any Court, and to order by what name and in what towns and places a Court shall be held in such District:

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. The County Court of Norfolk held at Attleborough and Watton shall cease to be held at Watton, and shall be held at Attleborough under the name of the County Court of Norfolk held at Attleborough.

2. The County Court of Norfolk held at Little Walsingham and Fakenham shall cease to be held at Little Walsingham, and shall be held at Fakenham under the name of the County Court of Norfolk held at Fakenham.

3. The Parishes set out in the first column of the Schedule to this Order shall cease to form part of the Districts set opposite to their names respectively in the second column of the said Schedule, and shall form part of the Districts set opposite to their names respectively in the third column thereof.

4. This Order shall come into operation on the 1st day of October, 1919, and shall be read with the County Courts (Districts) Order in Council, 1899, which shall have effect as amended by this Order.

18th August.

SCHEDULE.

First Column.	Second Column.	Third Column.
Parishes.	Districts.	Districts.
	Norfolk:—	*Norfolk*:—
Barningham Parva ...	Aylsham	Holt.
Colkirk	East Dereham ...	Fakenham.
Oxwick	East Dereham ...	Fakenham.
Weasenham All Saints...	East Dereham ...	Fakenham.
Weasenham St. Peter ...	East Dereham ...	Fakenham.
Wellingham	East Dereham ..	Fakenham.
Brinningham	Little Walsingham and Fakenham.	Holt.
Gunthorpe...	Little Walsingham and Fakenham.	Holt.
Sharrington	Little Walsingham and Fakenham.	Holt.
Aldborough	Holt	Aylsham.
Overstrand	Holt	North Walsham
Watton	Attleborough and Watton.	Swaffham.
Ovington	Attleborough and Watton.	Swaffham.
Bridgham	Attleborough and Watton.	Thetford.
	Suffolk:—	*Suffolk*:—
Barnby	Lowestoft	Beccles and Bungay
Mutford	Lowestoft	Beccles and Bungay
Elvedon	Mildenhall	Thetford.
	Cambridgeshire:—	*Cambridgeshire*:—
Papworth Everard ...	Cambridge	Huntingdon.
	Hertfordshire:—	*Bedfordshire*:—
Hinxworth	Royston	Biggleswade.
	Bedfordshire:—	*Northamptonshire*:—
Melchbourne	Bedford	Wellingborough.
Yielden	Bedford	Wellingborough.
	Essex:—	*Essex*:—
Vange	Brentwood	Southend.
So much of the parish of Enfield as lies west of a line drawn along the middle of the road leading from Southgate to Potters Bar.	Edmonton and Wood Green.	Barnet and St. Albans.
Laindon Hills	Grays Thurrock ...	Southend.
Buckhurst Hill	Romford and Ilford...	Bow.
Rainham	Romford and Ilford...	Grays Thurrock.
Wennington	Romford and Ilford...	Grays Thurrock.

[*Gazette*, 22nd August.

SOMERSET COUNTY COURT.

Whereas it is necessary to amend the County Court (Districts) Order in Council, dated the 25th day of June, 1919, and relating to the County Court of Somersetshire held at Frome and to the County District of Radstock, therein described as the Rural District of Radstock:

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in that behalf by the County Courts Act, 1888, or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that:—

"The word "Urban" shall be substituted for the word "Rural" in the said Order in Council of the 25th day of June, 1919, and the said Order shall be read and have effect and be deemed always to have had effect as if the said County District had been therein described as the Urban District of Radstock.

18th August. [*Gazette*, 19th August.

REVOCATION OF DEFENCE OF THE REALM REGULATIONS.

[Recitals.]

It is hereby ordered that the following amendments be made in the Defence of the Realm Regulations:—

RESTRICTIONS ON FINANCIAL DEALINGS ABROAD.

1. Regulations 41 D and 41 DD [62 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, p. 639] are hereby revoked.

2. The regulation mentioned in the first column of the Schedule to this Order is hereby revoked to the extent specified in the second column of that Schedule.

18th August.

SCHEDULE.

REGULATION PARTIALLY REVOKED.

No. of Regulation.	Extent of Revocation.
30F	In paragraph (4) the words "or (*b*) buy or sell any stock, shares, or other securities which have at any time since the 30th September, 1914, been in physical possession outside the United Kingdom."

[*Gazette*, 22nd August.

TRANSFER OF POWERS AS TO PENSIONS.

Whereas by the new Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916, provision is made, amongst other things, for the transfer to the Minister of Labour of such powers and duties of any Government Department or Authority relating to labour or industry, whether conferred by statute or otherwise, as His Majesty may, by Order in Council, transfer to him:

And whereas it is further provided by the said Act that, where any powers and duties are transferred by virtue of the said Act, the transfer

is to take effect as from a date to be fixed by order of His Majesty in Council:

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. There shall be transferred to the Minister of Labour the powers and duties (*a*) of the Minister of Pensions and of the Special Grants Committee relating to the training and employment of the widows and dependents (other than children under sixteen years of age) of deceased officers and men now vested in the Minister of Pensions and the Special Grants Committee by section 3 (1) (k) of the Naval and Military War Pensions, &c., Act, 1915, as amended by sections 1 and 2 of the Naval and Military War Pensions (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1917, or otherwise; and (*b*) of the Minister of Pensions relating to the instruction and training of widows of deceased men vested in the Minister of Pensions by Article 14 of the Royal Warrant of the 17th April, 1918, as to the pensions of soldiers and their families, and by Article 14 of the Regulations annexed to the Order in Council of 14th January, 1919, as to the pensions of seamen and their families.

2. The transfer to the Minister of Labour of these powers and duties shall take effect as from the 1st day of September, 1919.

3. This Order may be cited as the Ministry of Labour (Transfer of Powers) (No. 2) Order, 1919.

18th August. [*Gazette*, 22nd August.

Ministry of Food Orders.

THE JAM AND SYRUP (REGISTRATION OF DEALERS) ORDER, 1918.

Notice of Revocation.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby revokes, as from the 31st July, 1919, the Jam and Syrup (Registration of Dealers) Order, 1918 [S. R. & O., No. 1215 of 1918], but without prejudice to any proceedings in respect of any contravention thereof.

29th July.

THE BREAD ORDER, 1918.

Notice of Revocation of Part of the Above Order.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby revokes, as on the 1st August, 1919, clauses 1 to 6, inclusive, and clause 10 of the Bread Order, 1918 [S. R. & O., No. 547 of 1918], but without prejudice to any proceedings in respect of any contravention thereof.

30th July.

THE VEAL (RESTRICTION OF SALES) ORDER, 1919.

1. (*a*) No veal shall be sold, supplied or offered or exposed for sale for human consumption except to persons who in the ordinary course of their business are manufacturers of sausages, meat pies and other similar articles and for the purposes of such business; or as part of the contents of a sausage, meat pie or other similar article.

(*b*) No veal shall be sold, supplied or offered or exposed for sale by a retail meat dealer for human consumption except as part of the contents of a sausage, meat pie or other similar article.

(*c*) The restrictions on the sale of veal contained in this clause shall not apply to the sale of calves' heads or feet.

2. Infringements of this Order are summary offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

3. (*a*) This Order may be cited as the Veal (Restriction of Sales) Order, 1919, and shall come into force on the 4th August, 1919.

(*b*) This Order shall not apply to Ireland.

30th July.

The following Food Orders have also been issued:—

The Meat (Dealers' Restriction) Order, 1918. General Licence relating to Caterers. 17th July.

The Live Stock (Sales) Order, 1918. Notice relating to In-calf Cows or Heifers. 25th July.

The Canned Condensed Milk (Retail Prices) Order, 1918. Notice of Maximum Prices. 2nd August.

The Butter (Distribution) Order, 1917. The Rationing Order, 1918. Directions. 6th August.

Appeals to the House of Lords *in Forma Pauperis*.

In the House of Lords on the 14th inst., the Lord Chancellor moved that Standing Order No. X., regulating judicial proceedings, be amended by adding at the end of the Order the following new paragraph, viz.:—

"Ordered, that when the payment of costs is so ordered to a successful appellant in an appeal *in forma pauperis*, the taxing officer shall not, on taxation, allow the fees of the House nor the fees of counsel, but shall allow to the solicitor his costs out of pocket, with a reasonable allowance (such allowance to be taken as three-eighths of the solicitor's charges in 'Dives' appeals, other than out-of-pocket costs) to cover office expenses, including clerks, &c."

The motion was agreed to.

Vesting Orders in Lunacy.

The *Weekly Notes* has published the following practice note on vesting orders in lunacy:—"The Judges of the Chancery Division think it desirable that in future all applications for vesting orders under the Lunacy Act, 1911, should be intituled as follows:—'In the Matter of the trusts of' [instrument creating the trust] 'and in the Matter of the Acts 53 Vict., cap. 5, and 1 and 2 Geo. 5, cap. 40.' And that the lunatic trustee should be made a respondent to all such applications, but should not be served with the summons without the direction of the Judge."

The Agricultural Land Sales (Restriction of Notices to Quit) Act, 1919.

The following is the text of the Agricultural Land Sales (Restriction of Notices to Quit) Bill as amended on Third Reading in the House of Lords. It was passed on 19th August:—

Be it enacted, &c.:—

1. *Restriction of notices to quit.*]—On the making, after the passing of this Act, of any contract for sale of a holding, or any part of a holding held by a tenant from year to year, any then current and unexpired notice to determine the tenancy of the holding given to the tenant, either before or after the passing of this Act, shall be null and void, unless the tenant shall, after the passing of this Act and prior to such contract of sale, by writing, agree that such notice shall be valid.

2. *Definitions.*]—In this Act—

"Agricultural land" means land which is either wholly agricultural or wholly pastoral, or in part agricultural and as to the rest pastoral or in whole or in part cultivated as a market garden.

"Holding" means a parcel of agricultural land held by a tenant and which is not let to the tenant during his continuance in any office, appointment or employment held under the landlord.

"Market garden" means a holding cultivated wholly or mainly for the purpose of the trade or business of market gardening.

3. *Exemption of purchases for public purposes.*]—This Act shall not apply to a contract for sale to a Government department or local authority for the purpose of providing small holdings or allotments, or for any other public purpose made within three years after the passing of this Act.

4. *Application of Act.*]—This Act shall not apply to Scotland or Ireland.

5. *Short title.*]—This Act may be cited as the Agricultural Land Sales (Restriction of Notices to Quit) Act, 1919.

Solicitors' War Memorial Fund.

(Registered under the War Charities Act, 1916.)

The following donations, which with those already acknowledged bring the amount of the Fund up to a sum of £39,968 5s. 6d., have been received or promised.

Amounts received from country solicitors are so marked, the remainder are from London solicitors.

	£	s.	d.
Tyrer, Kenion, Tyrer and Simpson, Liverpool ...	105	0	0
Dowsons	100	0	0
Taylor, Willcocks & Co.	52	10	0
Bolton, Jobson and Yate Lee	26	5	0
G. B. Laurence	21	0	0
Fairfoot, Rooke and Macdonald	15	15	0
Chas. Humphries & Co.	10	10	0
Alfd. H. Drew	10	10	0
Waugh and Musgraves, Cockermouth	10	10	0
Underhill, Neve Taylor & Co. and R. A. Willcocks, Taylor & Co., Wolverhampton (additional) ...	10	10	0
F. J. Abbott	10	0	0
W. Mortimer Wilson, Alfreton	5	5	0
King and Sharman, March	5	5	0
C. E. W. Ogilvie	5	5	0
Maxwell De la Combe, Westerham, Kent	5	5	0
J. P. Hubbersty, Leeds	5	5	0
W. S. Daglish and Mulcaster, Newcastle-upon-Tyne	5	0	0
W. H. Churton and Son, Chester	5	0	0
Chas. A. Brown	3	3	0
L. O. Need, Lincoln	3	0	0
H. S. Cartmell, Carlisle	2	2	0
Tinley Barton, Bournemouth	2	2	0
Jas. C. Bate, Chester	2	2	0
Bertram Sturt	2	2	0
E. B. Loynes and Son, Wells, Norfolk	2	2	0
W. H. Dale	2	2	0
Ar. M. James, Swansea	1	1	0
Clem Cole, Calne	1	1	0
Alfd. Newman, Hadleigh (Suffolk)	1	1	0
Alfred Bates, Morecambe	1	1	0
A. J. Vere Bass	1	1	0

Sir J. Simon's Letter to the Board of Trade on Embargoes.

The Solicitor,
The Board of Trade,
Whitehall, S.W.

DEAR SIR,—I write to give you notice that in about a fortnight's time I expect to be returning from Spain by the P. and O. liner *Kaiser I Hind*, and that I intend to bring with me for purposes of import into this country certain goods of foreign origin the importation of which is prohibited by Proclamations purporting to be made under section 43 of the Customs Laws Consolidation Act, 1876.

That section, as you know, authorizes the Executive to prohibit the importation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder, or any other goods, but it has hitherto been generally supposed that the expression "any other goods" must be construed to mean any other goods of the same kind as those mentioned, and that consequently the section could confer no authority to prohibit or restrict the importation of furniture, boots, chinaware, locks, wire, cycle accessories, and hundreds of other useful articles which have no resemblance to arms, ammunition, or gunpowder, and the price of which is so high in England.

If this is not the true construction of the section, then the power of the Executive to interfere with our import trade is quite unrestricted, and statutory authority to abolish free imports is superfluous. Moreover, if the section really confers this enormously wide power on a Government department, it is difficult to understand why Parliament ever mentioned arms, ammunition, and gunpowder in the section at all.

Will you please inform the Imports Restrictions Department and the President of the Board of Trade of the contents of this letter, so that instructions may be given to the Customs Officer at Tilbury how to deal with my goods when the ship arrives. In order to avoid any misapprehension I had better add that I am not applying for any licence to import, as if the Proclamation is without lawful authority I do not need any permission to do so.

The goods will be quite new, and are not for my own personal use; I intend to sell them again.

Kindly communicate with my solicitors, Messrs. Stevenson, Harwood & Co., 31, Lombard-street, E.C., as to whether the Customs House Officer will be instructed to oppose the importation of the goods when I declare them, as no time will then be lost in bringing an action which will test the legality of the Proclamations under which the Authorities are claiming to act.—Yours faithfully, (Signed) JOHN SIMON.

1, Airlie-gardens, W. 8.
16th August, 1919.

Legal News.

Changes in Partnerships.

Dissolution.

GEORGE NEVILE DAVID, ALEXANDER CHARLES ROBERT DAVID, and TREVOR EDWARD HARRIS, solicitors (George David & Co.), City of Cardiff, 11 August. The said Trevor Edward Harris retires from the said business, which will be carried on by the said George Nevile David and Alexander Charles Robert David, under the same style of George David & Co. [*Gazette*, Aug. 22.

Business Changes.

Messrs. FOSTER AND WELLS, solicitors and notaries, announce that since the death of the late Mr. R. H. Wells, Sir William Foster has retired, and the practice will in future be carried on at Aldershot, Farnborough, and Fleet by Mr. H. M. Foster and Mr. J. T. Coggins, who has joined the firm as from the 12th April, 1919.

Messrs. BURTON, YEATES & HART, of 23, Surrey-street, London, W.C. 2, inform us of the retirement, on account of ill-health, from their firm and from practice of Mr. Frederick Willson Yeates. The business will in future be carried on by Messrs. James Frederick Burton, Robert Pulsford Hart, William Scott Hart, William John Collyer, and Henry Robert Hart. The last named assisted them in the business before the war, and when demobilised from the Army rejoined their staff. No change will be made in the style of the firm.

General.

A special staff has been appointed by the Board of Trade to deal with all questions arising under the Profiteers Act. Sir Auckland Geddes had a conference on Monday with Mr. McCurdy, M.P., the chairman of the new Central Committee. This body will investigate cases of profiteering other than by retailers, and collect information in regard to prices, costs and profits. Mr. McCurdy will have the assistance of such deputy-chairmen as the Board of Trade may think fit to appoint, and chambers of commerce, trade unions, and other bodies will be asked to suggest the names of suitable members. The Central Committee may appoint sub-committees to make investigations on which suggestions for fair prices may be made to the Board of Trade. Mr. W. J. Hands is the controller of this new profiteering department, and all communications should be addressed to him at 1, Queen Anne's Gate-buildings, Westminster. Local authorities will set up their own tribunals.

Peace teas in the streets are banned, and those who desire to entertain children will have to find some other venue. The story of a party which was interrupted by the police was told at Lambeth on Monday, when Mrs. Annie Hines was fined 40s. for obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty. The constable told the court that while he was assisting to clear away a large crowd in Alfreton-street, Lambeth, on Saturday evening, Mrs. Hines became very excited, and as she refused to go away he took her to the station. A crowd followed, and stones and apples were thrown at the police. Inspector Coe stated that ropes had been drawn across the road, blocking the thoroughfare, and there were two pianos on the footway. He ordered the ropes to be removed and the people dispersed. Councillor J. Bird, ex-Mayor of Southwark, said that he attended the party, and found everything in perfect order. He was under the impression that police sanction had been obtained. Mr. Wyvester said it would not do to have functions of this kind in the public streets with ropes thrown across the roadway.

Winding-up Notices.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, August 22.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

ANGLO-FRENCH COASTING CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Alfred E. Bowen, 7, Bruzennose-st., Manchester, liquidator.

ASPATRIA PUBLIC HALL CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 1, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Cameron, Aspatria, Cumberland, liquidator.

BROUGHTON RUBBER CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 30, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Frederick Selby Burman, 29, Princess-st., Manchester, liquidator.

FOWEY (NO. 4) STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 22, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Adolphus Philp, 7, Prince's-st., Truro, liquidator.

INTERNATIONAL EXCLUSIVES, LTD. (IN LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Oct. 18, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to H. Franklin, 2, Gerrard-pl., liquidator.

J. GREGORY & CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 3, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Jabez Gregory, Pentnewynydd, Mon., liquidator.

SHIELDS PROPERTY INVESTMENT AND TRADING CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 30, to send in their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Thomas Vasey, 50, King-st., South Shields, liquidator.

TEMPLEMAN SINCLAIR & CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Geo. A. G. Robertson, 13, Basinghall-st., liquidator.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 26.

BARNFIELD MILL SPINNING CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Oct. 9, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Thomas Potter, Greenfield, near Oldham, liquidator.

BOTTOMLEY, SONS & CO. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to James Herbert Haley, Tyrrel-st., Bradford, liquidator.

EMPIRE THEATRE (EARBY), LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 13, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Henry Mortimer Baggs, North-st., Keighley, liquidator.

"GATE" STEAMSHIP CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Oct. 8, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Middleton, 19 and 20, Blackfriargate, Hull, liquidator.

LEICESTER DISTRICT ARMAMENTS GROUP OF ENGINEERING EMPLOYERS, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 17, to send in their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Percy Russell, Corridor-chmbrs., Leicester, liquidator.

LLEYN MINES, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Oct. 8, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William John Peter, 22, Basinghall-st., liquidator.

NETTLE'S PHARMACY, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Oct. 6, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William John Peter, 22, Basinghall-st., liquidator.

OFFORD & CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 25, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to George Cranmore Taylor, 115-117, Colmore-row, Birmingham, liquidator.

Resolutions for Winding-up Voluntarily.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, August 22.

Prestwich Picturedrome, Ltd	Clayton West Working Men's Club, Ltd.
Yardley's Dividend Stores, Ltd.	Fowey (No. 4) Steamship Co., Ltd.
Seeman & Stones, Ltd.	Templeman Sinclair & Co., Ltd.
Albion Iron Co. (London), Ltd.	Walker & Co. (Swinton), Ltd.
Raglan Engineering Co., Ltd.	Scarborough Athletic Co., Ltd.
Lincolnshire Steamship Co., Ltd.	Manbré Saccharine Co., Ltd.
G. A. Syndicate, Ltd.	Empire Theatre (Earby), Ltd.
Leicester District Armaments Group of Engineering Employers, Ltd.	Acetylene Equipment Co., Ltd.
Bottomley, Sons & Co., Ltd.	East Surrey Land Co., Ltd.
J. Gregory & Co., Ltd.	Aspatria Public Hall Co., Ltd.
Motor Hire Purchase Syndicate, Ltd.	Tywardreath Aerated and Mineral Water Co., Ltd.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 26.

Lleyn Mines, Ltd.	Tong Liberal Club Building Co., Ltd.
Thomas Heath Co., Ltd.	Wednesbury Engineering Co. (1919), Ltd.
Workington Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.	Anglo-American Assets Co., Ltd.
Nettle's Pharmacy, Ltd.	Workington Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.
H. Southall & Co., Ltd.	William A. Althorp, Ltd.
Westmorland Farmers' Association, Ltd.	Properties Selection and Trust, Ltd.
Barnfield Mill Spinning Co., Ltd.	Hunting Steamship Co., Ltd.
	Sugar and Malt Products, Ltd.

Creditors' Notices.

Under 22 & 23 Vict. cap. 35.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, August 15.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

MORRIN, WILLIAM ARTHUR, Petit Brule, St. Augustin County, Quebec, Canada. Sept. 5. Dowsons, 18, Adam-st., Adelphi.

NORTON, HELEN ALLOWAY AGNES, Parkstone, Dorset. Sept. 16. Simpson, Rushforth & Co., 6, Moorgate-st.

SASSE, AUGUST FERDINAND, Kilburn, Baker. Sept. 19. Rundle & Hobrow, 9, Ironmonger-la., Cheapside.

SHEPPARD, WALTER SIDNEY, Eastbourne. Sept. 16. W. E. Singleton, 37, Essex-st.

SHEPHERD, WILLIAM, Tower Bridge-rd., Bermondsey. Sept. 23. Moon, Gilks & Moon, 24, Bloomsbury-sq.

SHAW, THOMAS DOUGLAS, Kensington Gardens-sq. Sept. 15. Herbert W. R. Davis, 120, Chancery-la.

SMITH, ALFRED, Stanton Lacy, Salop, Farmer. Sept. 12. Weyman, Weyman & Estyn Jones, Ludlow

SMITH, THOMAS WILLIAM, Wanstead, Essex, Cashier. Sept. 30. Archibald R. Kirk, 18, Eldon-st.

SOUTH, WILLIAM, or SOUTH, SUSANNAH, Downham Market, Norfolk. Sept. 29. John G. Sherman, Downham Market, Norfolk.

THORNES, EMILY ANN, Brockley. Sept. 29. John Charles Brookhouse, 8 and 9, Queen-st., Cheapside.

TUCKER, WILLIAM HENRY, Cardiff. Sept. 12. Yorath & Jones, Cardiff.

WALTON, EMILY, Ladysmith, Natal Province, Union of S. Africa. Oct. 12. Thompsons, Quarrell & Jones, 3, East India-av.

WALKER, HENRY, Cannon-st., Publisher. Sept. 16. Leader, Plunkett & Leader, 76, Newgate-st.

WATKINS, WILLIAM YEOMANS, Trelleck, Mon. Sept. 12. Vizard & Son, Monmouth.

WELLS, GEORGE ALFRED, Norwich. Sept. 24. Gilbert Samuel & Co., 5 and 6, Great Winchester-st.

WELLS, ARTHUR ERNEST, Old Bond-st. Sept. 12. Lumley & Lumley, 37, Conduit-st.

WHITTAKER, THOMAS, Maidenhead. Sept. 15. Wootton & Son, 65, London-wall.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 19.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

BELL, GEORGE LANCASTER, Sedgley Park, Prestwich, Lancs. Sept. 16. Blair & Seddon, Manchester.

BURGON, REBECCA, Sydney, New South Wales. Oct. 3. Lattey & Hart, 138, Leadenhall-st.

BURTON, GEORGE, Thorpe, Willoughby, Yorks., Farmer. Sept. 20. Parker & Parker, Selby.

CHADWICK, AMOS, Southport, Lancs. Oct. 1. Tomkinson, Norris & Norris, Stoke-on-Trent.

COVENTRY, CORNELIUS, Northumberland pk., Tottenham. Sept. 30. Howard & Shelton, Lincoln House, Fore-st.

CRICKLOW, THOMAS MOORE, Norton Green, Staffs., Builder. Oct. 1. Tomkinson, Norris & Norris, Burslem, Stoke-on-Trent.

CROOKES, Sir WILLIAM, Knight, O.M., Notting Hill. Sept. 16. Bridgman & Co., 4, College-hill, Cannon-st.

CRABTREE, WILLIAM, Rochdale, Lancs., Draper. Sept. 24. J. H. Chadwick, Rochdale.

DAVIDSON, JOHN PERCIVAL, Cramlington, Northumberland, Farmer. Sept. 15. James R. Wheldon, South Shields.

DANFORD, CHARLES, Adelaide, South Australia. Sept. 15. Wm. Shoosmith & Sons, Northampton.

DRISCOLL, ROSINA JANE, St. Paul's-rd., Tottenham. Sept. 30. Howard Rumney, 12, Craven-st., Charing Cross.

GARTSIDE, SARAH ANN, Rusholme, Manchester. Sept. 20. Wm. Almond & Sons, Manchester.

GOSTELOW, ELIZABETH MARY, Forest Gate, Essex. Sept. 20. Aird, Hood & Co., 4, Brabant-ct.

GREENWOOD, ALBERT, Bradford, Mechanic. Sept. 1. Geo Turnbull & Son, Bradford.

GREST, GRACE, Newton Abbot. Sept. 30. Webster & Watson, Newton Abbot.

HAYWARD, JANE PIERCE, Clifton, Bristol. Oct. 11. Meade-King, Cooke & Co., Bristol.

HEYWOOD, WILLIAM WATSON, Thornhill-rd., Derby. Sept. 30. Moody & Woolley, Derby.

HELLIWELL, EMILY, Handsworth, Birmingham. Sept. 20. Wallace, Robinson & Morgan, Birmingham.

HELLIWELL, JOSEPH HENRY, Handsworth, Birmingham. Sept. 20. Wallace, Robinson & Morgan, Birmingham.

HOLLAND, THOMAS WIRBY, Chester, Solicitor. Sept. 29. Holland, Holland & Turner, Chester.

JONES, DANIEL, Albrighton, Salop. Oct. 1. Fowler, Langley & Wright, Wolverhampton.

ELLIS-JONES, MARGARET JANE, Wallasey, Chester. Sept. 9. J. F. Read & Brown, Liverpool.

LAW, WILLIAM, Stoneycroft, Liverpool. Sept. 9. J. F. Read & Brown, Liverpool.

LEFEBURE, FLORINE HENRIETTE, Edgbaston, Birmingham. Oct. 1. King & Mills, Birmingham.

LEWIS, SALOME, Cheltenham. Sept. 25. Herbert Stroud, Cheltenham

LOVERIDGE, WILLIAM, Cheltenham, Publican. Sept. 12. Steel & Broom, Cheltenham.

MATHER, GEORGE ALEXANDER, Birkdale, Lancs. Sept. 30. Toulmin, Ward & Co., Liverpool.

MARSHALL, JOHN, Wendover, Bucks. Sept. 29. Waller, Neale & Houlston, 75, Coleman-st.

MARTELL, EDWARD JACOB, Freemantle, Southampton. Sept. 26. Paris, Smith & Randall, Southampton.

MULLETT, THOMAS, Catford, Kent, Accountant. Sept. 30. Hays, Roughton & Dunn, 11-12, Clement's-la.

PARTRIDGE, OSWALD, Prenton, Chester. Sept. 9. J. F. Read & Brown, Liverpool.

RICHMOND, KATHERINE, Woking. Sept. 15. Hatten, Winnett & Hatten, Gravesend.

SILCOCK, WILLIAM, Leeds. Sept. 11. Davies & Burrows, Leeds.

WATSON, ANN, Cloughton, Yorks. Sept. 30. Medley, Drawbridge & Co., Scarborough.

WAKEHAM, Dr. CHARLES HENRY, Harrow-rd. Sept. 15. Barclays Bank, Lt., Trustee Department, 3, Bank-bldgs., Lothbury.

WHITESIDE, RICHARD, Blackpool, Sub-Postmaster. Sept. 15. C. E. Tatham, Blackpool.

WILKINS, HARRIET, Shepreth, Cambridge. Sept. 15. Wrotham & Co., Royston, Herts.

WILLIS, JAMES LEGGE NOTT, Bournemouth. Sept. 19. Philip F. Tanner, Bournemouth.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, August 22.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

ADIE, WILLIAM EDWARD, Edgbaston, Birmingham. Sept. 20. Tyndall, Nichols & Hadfield, Birmingham.

AINSWORTH, EMILY, Marton, Blackpool. Oct. 6. Britcliffe & Son, Accrington.

AINSWORTH, THOMAS, Blackpool, Cotton Manufacturer. Oct. 6. Britcliffe & Son, Accrington.

AYTON, JOHN FREDERICK, Chiswick. Sept. 24. Alfred Allistone, 32, Bedford-row.

BEECROFT, SAMUEL, White Lee, Batley, Yorks. Sept. 13. C. Stanley Hays, Heckmondwike.

BEAUVOISIN, WILLIAM EDWARD, Birmingham, Commercial Agent. Sept. 18. Wallace, Robinson & Morgan, Birmingham.

BOWRING, GEORGE, Hordle, Hants. Sept. 13. Heppenstall & Clark, Lymington, Hants.

BOWKER, ELIZA, Bolton, Lancs. Sept. 15. Cooper & Hamer, Bolton.

BRAND, DANIEL BENJAMIN, Charlwood, Surrey, Butcher. Sept. 15. Frederick Bussacott, 218, Norbury-cres., Norbury.

BUNYARD, GEORGE, Maidstone, Nurseryman. Sept. 22. C. Butcher & Harper, 32, Gresham-st.

BURGESS, JOSEPH, Knutsford, Chester, Surveyor. Sept. 20. Sedgley, Caldecutt & Co., Knutsford.

CROZIER, JOHN BRAHAM, Walton-le-Dale, near Preston, Lancs, Market Gardener. Sept. 22. Coupe & Harrison, Preston.

CUTHBERT, MARTHA EAST, Basford, Notts. Sept. 29. L. Bramley, Nottingham.

EDWARDS, ANNIE ELIZA, Thornton Heath, Surrey. Sept. 22. C. Butcher & Harper, 32, Gresham-st.

FORREST, AUGUSTA, Torquay. Sept. 22. Hext, Foster & Somerville, Torquay.

GASKELL, HOLBROOK, Frodsham, Chester. Sept. 30. J. F. Harrison & Burton, Liverpool.

GILL, LEONARD UPCOTT, Cricklewood. Sept. 25. Theodore Goddard & Co., 19, Serjeants'-inn, Temple.

GOLDSTEIN, MAX, Plumstead. Sept. 20. Barclays Bank, Ltd., Trustee Dept., 3, Bank-bldgs., Lothbury.

GOSLING, LEONARD, Moseley, Birmingham. Sept. 20. Tyndall, Nichols & Hadfield, Birmingham.

GORE, ANN, Wigan, Lancs. Sept. 10. James C. Gibson, Wigan.

GORE, JOHN, Wigan, Lancs, Farmer. Sept. 10. James C. Gibson, Wigan.

GRIFFITHS, HARRIETT, Hereford. Oct. 1. Humfrys & Symonds, Hereford.

HARDMAN, FRED, Chorlton-cum-Hardy, Manchester, Paper Merchant. Sept. 13. Goulty & Goodfellow, Manchester.

HOPLEY, ELIZABETH, Over, Winsford, Chester. Sept. 16. Jno. H. Cooke & Sons, Winsford, Cheshire.

HUNTER, JOHN, Eastbourne. Sept. 20. Passingham & Hill, Hitchin, Herts.

HUNT, MARY ANN, Burwell, Cambridge. Sept. 7. Ennion & Ennion, Burwell.

IVATTS, CEDRIC PERCY, Savoy Hotel, Merchant's Agent. Dec. 1. Perowne & Co., 19, Coleman-st.

JACKSON, ANNIE MARY, Leyland, near Preston. Sept. 19. A. L. Garnett, Burnley.

JEPSON, MARGARET, Wigan, Lancs. Sept. 10. James C. Gibson, Wigan.

KELLY, HENRY, Blackburn, Lancs, Leather Merchant. Sept. 20. E. & B. Haworth, Blackburn.

KELAART, EDWARD FREDERICK, Throgmorton-st. Oct. 2. Herbert Smith, Goss, King & Gregory, 62, London-wall.

KING, FREDERICK JOHN, Croydon. Oct. 2. Herbert Smith, Goss, King & Gregory, 62, London-wall.